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Optimizing economic welfare in environmental governance has been criticized for delivering
short-term gains at the expense of long-term environmental degradation. Different from
economic optimization, the concepts of sustainability and the more recent safe operating
space have been used to derive policies in environmental governance. However, a formal
comparison between these three policy paradigms is still missing, leaving policy makers
uncertain which paradigm to apply. Here, we develop a better understanding of their
interrelationships, using a stylized model of human-environment tipping elements. We find
that no paradigm guarantees fulfilling requirements imposed by another paradigm and derive
simple heuristics for the conditions under which these trade-offs occur. We show that the
absence of such a master paradigm is of special relevance for governing real-world tipping
systems such as climate, fisheries, and farming, which may reside in a parameter regime
where economic optimization is neither sustainable nor safe.
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The Sustainable Development Goals
1 and the Paris climate
agreement set the target of prosperous development for
people and our planet. Yet, it remains challenging to
translate these aims into concrete policy implementations,
accounting for non-linearities, such as tipping elements2,3, regime
shifts4,5, and multi-stabilities6, as well as multiple kinds of
uncertainties7–9, and extreme events10.
To support the decision making processes in these contexts, we
ask the question how the three prominent decision making
paradigms of economic welfare optimization, sustainability and
safe operating space compare with each other. Specifically, we
investigate the parameter regimes for synergies and trade-offs
when applying these paradigms to the management of tipping
elements11 and how these findings relate to the three real-world
systems of climate, fisheries and farming.
Optimization approaches have emerged as the primary guiding
principle to derive a policy strategy for environmental govern-
ance12,13. Most often, the present value of macroeconomic social
welfare, i.e., the sum of discounted future benefits minus costs, is
the target to be optimized. Such optimization approaches have
been criticized regarding the discount rates used, delivering short
term gains at the expense of long-term environmental degrada-
tion14,15. Further criticism targets the lack of a systems perspec-
tive required to understand the structural landscape of model
dynamics, as well as the assumptions made due to imperfect
information6,9,10. This critique is partly dealt with in optimization
variants, such as robust7,16 or viable17–19 control, which are
dealing with multiple types of uncertainty20. Naturally, other or
multiple objectives21 and criteria22,23 with possible constraints24
can be optimized as well. In this work, we use the term solely in
the narrow economic sense of maximizing the present value as
defined in Eq. 1 below.
In recognition of increasing environmental and social threats25
the policy paradigm of sustainability has emerged in the scientific
and political discourse26,27. The economics of sustainability has
brought up many definitions of sustainability alone28–31. In these
analyses sustainability is usually imposed as a constraint within
an economic welfare optimization paradigm. Trade-offs to eco-
nomic welfare optimization are well known28,32. However, these
classic social welfare optimization approaches are challenged
through the increasing recognition of non-linearities, such as
tipping points, regime shifts, uncertainties and the risk of cata-
strophic outcomes6,9. Taking up these challenges, e.g., non-
convexities33 and climate tipping elements34,35 have been studied
within an economic framework. Here, we derive our formal
definition of sustainability from the Brundtland report26. Its
design is deliberately simple and targeted to the mathematical
framework we use (see below). We do not intend our definition to
be applicable to a general model of a welfare economy12,27.
Recent advances in sustainability science have brought forth
tolerable windows36 or safe operating spaces37,38 as a policy
paradigm to derive concrete actions from39. These concepts ori-
ginate from resilience thinking40 and a precautionary principle41
to deal with potential dangerous tipping elements in the envir-
onmental governance system. Trade-offs but also synergies with
optimization thinking have been therefore discussed42. Also for-
mal analyses studying relations between resilience as a system
property and sustainability were conducted43,44.
However, the reciprocal relationships between these three
paradigms of economic optimization, sustainability and safe
operating space is still insufficiently explored. Such an
understanding is important in order to judge, for example,
when economic optimization is, or is not, an appropriate policy
goal. Also, guidance is required when a sustainability
paradigm may conflict with a safe operating space paradigm and
vice versa.
Here, we report progress towards a better understanding of the
mutual relationships between these three paradigms of economic
optimization, sustainability and safe operating space by applying
them to a stylized model of a human-environment tipping ele-
ment. We do so because of the increasing importance of tipping
points and regime shifts in environmental governance. Our
model is deliberately stylized, thereby applicable across multiple
cases and scales, to gain a deeper understanding more complex
models might miss. The formal definitions of the three paradigms
are designed to fit our mathematical framework (see below). Since
we do not focus on intragenerational justice in this article, one
agent suffices as a decision making subject, in contrast to a
multiagent setting. We find that there exists no master paradigm
between the three examined, i.e., a policy can be any combination
of optimal or not, sustainable or not and safe or not. This is of
special relevance to the climate system which may reside at the
edge in the parameter regime where economic welfare optimi-
zation becomes neither sustainable nor safe. This suggests the use
of more advanced paradigms to support decision making in cli-
mate policy.
Results
Stylized model of a human-environment tipping element. We
use the mathematical framework of Markov Decision
Processes45,46, in which an agent makes decisions about how to
interact with its environment (Fig. 1a). Our particular environ-
ment can reside in either a prosperous state, which provides
immediate rewards (also called payoffs) to the agent, or a
degraded state, from which the agent receives no payoff. At each
time step, the agent chooses between two actions a, exerting
either a high or low pressure on the environment. Depending on
the current state s, the current action a and the subsequent
state s′, the agent receives an immediate reward r (Fig. 1b).
At the prosperous state, taking the low pressure action the agent
is guaranteed to receive reward rl and remain at the
prosperous state. However, taking the high pressure action, the
agent may receive reward rh (which is typically larger than rl), but
risks triggering a collapse of the environment to the degraded
system state with non-zero probability δ and no immediate
reward at all. From there, only the low pressure action opens the
option to recover to the prosperous state with non-zero prob-
ability ρ.
For example, the high pressure action could correspond to
emitting a business-as-usual amount of carbon to the
atmosphere yielding a reward of high, short-term economic
output as long as the system has not tipped. The low
pressure action resembles emitting a reduced amount
of carbon, assuming a lower short-term economic output for
the guarantee to not trigger climate tipping elements into a
disastrous state.
A policy π is a function that specifies what action a to apply at
a system state s. The agent receives reward rt at time step t. The
value vπ(s) of a state s under a given policy π is given by the
expected value of the normalized accumulated discounted
rewards r with discount factor 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 when starting in state
S0= s and following policy π:
vπ sð Þ ¼ Eπ limT!1
PT
t¼0 γ
trtPT
t¼0 γt
S0 ¼ sj
" #
: ð1Þ
Note that the discount factor actually denotes the farsighted-
ness of the agent. Thus, γ= 1 corresponds to no discounting
(weighting all rewards equally regardless of when they are
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expected), whereas γ= 0 corresponds to completely myopic, fully
discounting agents.
Paradigm definitions. We classify policies according to whether
they are economic welfare optimal or not, sustainable or not, and
safe or not. For the sake of simplicity we focus on two determi-
nistic policies, distinguishing whether the agent should apply the
low or the high pressure action at the prosperous state (Fig. 1c):
the risky policy (πr(p)= h, πr(d)= l), applying the high pressure
action at the prosperous state and the low pressure one at the
degraded state and the cautious policy (πc(p)= l, πc(d)= l),
applying the low pressure action at the prosperous, as well as the
degraded state.
A policy π is defined as optimal (in the economic welfare sense)
if its value vπ(s) (Eq. 1) for every state s is larger than or equal to
the value of any other policy46.
Based on the Brundtland Commission’s report on sustainable
development26 a sustainable policy should fulfill two
requirements: First, meet the needs of the present. We translate
this formally into the agent evaluating the present state s as
acceptable (similar to viable17, tolerable36 or desirable47), if its
value (Eq. 1) exceeds a normatively chosen minimum acceptable
value rmin:
s acceptable under π iff vπ sð Þ  rmin ð2Þ
Note, that the division of state space into acceptable and
unacceptable states is not identical for all polices, but depends on
the rewards receivable through executing a policy. Second, a
sustainable policy should sustain the ability to meet the needs of
the future26.
We define a policy π as sustainable if every state the agent
eventually visits under policy π is acceptable (Eq. 2).
Note that this reduction of sustainability to the one-
dimensional value vπ(s) has much similarity with the notion of
weak sustainability48.
The Safe Operating Space (SOS)37 is typically defined as a
subset of the whole state space S, containing favorable system
states bounded by thresholds39,49. In practice, the position of
these potential tipping thresholds is always uncertain and the
boundaries are placed at the lower end of the uncertainty zone. In
that way the definition of the safe operating space states
constitutes a normative judgment about the risk the decision
maker is willing to tolerate. In the subsequent analyses we take
the extreme position of no risk tolerance and identify the SOS
with only the (more favorable) prosperous state, independent of
the collapse probability δ.
We define a policy π as safe if every state the agents eventually
visits under policy π lies within the SOS.
In contrast to acceptable and unacceptable states, safe states are
independent of the policy used.
In summary, our stylized model of a human-environment
tipping element depends on the five parameters δ, ρ, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh:
the probability of a collapse from the prosperous to the degraded
state under the high pressure action δ, the probability of recovery
from the degraded to the prosperous state under the low pressure
action ρ, the agent’s discount factor γ, the high reward receivable
from the high pressure action when staying at the prosperous
state rh, the low reward receivable by taking the low pressure
action at the prosperous state rl, and the normatively chosen
minimum acceptable reward rmin a state value must have to be
perceived as acceptable under a certain policy. Since all three
rewards come in arbitrary units, the policy classification only
depends on their ratios.
Classification of risky and safe policy. Based on Eqs. 1 and 2 we
analytically compute whether the risky and the cautious policy are
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optimal or not, sustainable or not and safe or not depending on
the model parameters (δ, ρ, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh) (see Methods and
Fig. 2).
We observe that above a certain critical value of the collapse
probability δ the cautious policy becomes optimal (Fig. 2a, pink),
despite the smaller immediate reward rl= 0.5rh. This result
confirms previous findings on optimal management with regime
shifts50.
Further, we find a decreasing critical collapse probability with
increasing farsightedness γ. Hence, for more farsighted societies
the risky policy is optimal only for small collapse probabilities δ
(orange).
Provided the low pressure reward exceeds the normative
minimum acceptable value threshold, rl ≥ rmin, then the cautious
policy is sustainable for all parameter combinations δ, ρ, γ, rl/rh
(Fig. 2b, blue and purple). Only for small collapse probabilities δ
and simultaneously high farsightedness γ the risky policy
becomes sustainable as well (purple). This is because in this
parameter region the risky policy is acceptable also at the
degraded state (Methods).
The cautious policy is a safe policy independently from the
parameter combinations δ, ρ, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh (Fig. 2c, green). It is
important to emphasize that there is no combination of
parameters at which the risky policy is safe.
Relationships between paradigms. We find that policies can be
classified along all logical combinations of the three examined
paradigms (optimization, sustainability, safe operating space).
This yields a classification of policies into eight different cate-
gories (Fig. 3).
In particular, optimal policies are not necessarily sustainable
(opt and not sus: Fig. 3, red and yellow). This is the case if the
normative value threshold rmin is too large. The cautious policy
does not return enough value to be sustainable (rl < rmin, yellow)
and the risky policy at the degraded state produces too little
future reward to be sustainable, due to the low chance of recovery
and lack of farsightedness.
Nor are optimal policies necessarily safe (opt and not safe:
Fig. 3, red and purple). This occurs in parameter regions where
the risky policy is optimal. The risky policy cannot be safe
because of the risk of collapse to the degraded state.
A safe policy does not necessarily imply a sustainable policy
either (safe and not sus: Fig. 3, green and yellow). When the
normative threshold value for sustainability rmin exceeds the
reward from a low pressure action rl: rmin > rl, then the cautious
policy is safe but not sustainable. Following a similar line of
argument, the SOS concept37 has been extended to a Safe And
Just Operating Space (SAJOS) which additionally accounts for
social indicators51, such as the number of people living in extreme
poverty. Thus, SAJOS policies can be interpreted as the overlap of
safe with sustainable policies. Within our model, we can give a
definite criterion for when this form of SAJOS exists: as long as
the reward from a low pressure action rl exceeds the normative
threshold value rmin (rl > rmin), the cautious policy is both safe and
sustainable (Fig. 3, cyan and gray).
However, there exist also sustainable policies outside the SOS
(sus and not safe: Fig. 3, blue and purple.) These are risky policies
(hence, not safe) with simultaneously high farsightedness γ and
low collapse probability δ. At those parameter regions the
degraded state is still evaluated as acceptable due to sufficient
anticipated future rewards and therefore the risky policy is
sustainable. The circumstance that parameter regimes exist that
are sustainable but not safe and vice versa clearly stems from our
definition of sustainability which resembles a form of weak
sustainability48. By doing so we can conceptually separate issues
of environmentally safe and socially just without compromising
the target of a safe and just parameter space regime.
Note that this classification into the eight different policy
paradigm combinations also applies to the case of absolute
farsightedness (γ= 1; see the tops of Fig. 3b–e). Thus, the trade-
offs between the examined paradigms do not vanish, as one might
presume considering the debate about appropriate discount
rates14,52.
Volume of paradigm combinations. So far, we have visualized
the parameter space of our stylized tipping element model in two
dimensional sections and fixed the remaining parameters for
illustrative purposes. By doing so, we showed the mutual
dependence between parameters, foremost the discount factor γ
and the collapse probability δ. However, in the light of con-
siderable parameter uncertainty we ask how large the eight
regimes of paradigm combinations are, given the whole para-
meter space (Fig. 4).
We observe the most likely option to be the regime that is
neither optimal, neither sustainable nor safe followed by the
parameter sweet spot regime in which all paradigms yield the
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cautious policy as optimal, sustainable and safe. Together they
constitute a parameter space volume of approx. 45% in which the
three paradigms of economic optimization, sustainability and safe
operating space align with each other in yielding the same policy.
Interestingly, the third likeliest option is the paradigm combina-
tion in which the risky policy is optimal but neither sustainable
nor safe. This is the most likeliest parameter regime among those
where the paradigms yield different policies. Thus, blindly
applying economic optimization in a our stylized tipping element
has a significant chance of leading to policies that are neither
sustainable nor safe.
On the other hand, the volume of the safe and just operating
space (gray and cyan bars in Fig. 4) is comparable to the most
likeliest (black) regime. Thus, about one out of four random
1.0
Risky policy Cautious policy
Sustainability
paradigm
sus, not opt, not safe
sus, safe,
not opt
opt, sus,
not safe,
opt, safe,
not sus,
not opt, not sus, not safe
Low normative threshold rmin
High normative threshold rmin
opt, sus, safe
SAJOS
opt, not sus, 
not safe
sus & not safe
opt & not safe
opt & not sus
safe & not sus
Optimality
paradigm
Safe
op. space
paradigm
safe, not opt,
not sus
1.
0
0.8
0.
8
0.6
D
is
co
un
t f
ac
to
r 

Collapse probability  Collapse probability 
0.
6
0.4
0.
4
0.2
0.
2
0.0
1.0
0.8
0.6
D
is
co
un
t f
ac
to
r 

0.4
0.2
0.0
0.
0
1.
0
0.
8
0.
6
0.
4
0.
2
0.
0
a
b d
c e
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decision making agents interacting with a random tipping
element will end up in the safe and just operating space.
Application to real-world human-environment tipping ele-
ments. The above policy classification offers valuable insights for
the governance of real-world human-environment systems. We
discuss how our analysis relates to the cases of the climate system,
fisheries and farming. Our purpose is to gain a qualitative
understanding how our model relates to important real-world
challenges of environmental governance, not a detailed assess-
ment of the latter. Therefore, we roughly estimate the respective
collapse and recovery probabilities per time step δ and ρ of our
model via the typical timescales on which these systems remain in
one state or the other (see Methods). Additionally, we added a
parameter sensitivity analysis by visualizing the likelihood of
ending up in a certain parameter regime by color gradients
between regimes (Fig. 5).
Regarding the climate system, we acknowledge that several
interacting tipping elements contribute to the system’s behavior2
and its representation as a single tipping element is a huge
simplification on its own. Nevertheless, we assume that the
current state of the climate system is still comparable to the
prosperous one of our model and relevant timescales for
triggering a collapse of 30 to 50 years under business-as-usual
socio-economic development scenarios2,53,54. Regarding the
recovery timescale it has been shown that human perturbations
of the climate system already changed its trajectory on a multi-
millennial timescale55,56. Therefore we assume a recovery
probability per time step ρ close to zero (Fig. 5).
For sufficiently large collapse probabilities (collapse time scale
near 20 years and smaller), the climate system is likely to reside in
a parameter sweet spot (gray area), where applying an optimiza-
tion, sustainability or SOS paradigm results in the cautious policy
as the advisable way of governing the climate system. However, if
the collapse probability per time step is smaller (collapse time
scale near 50 years and larger) the situation is different. Here, an
SOS and a sustainable paradigm would still yield the cautious
policy (Fig. 5, cyan), but an optimization paradigm is likely to
give the risky policy (Fig. 5, red), which at this point is neither
sustainable nor safe. We conclude that in climate policy,
economic welfare optimization alone may neither be sustainable
nor safe.
For fishery systems, both transition probabilities certainly
depend on a variety of factors, e.g., fisher’s technical and cultural
traits or the dominant fish species in the system, as well as
external factors such as climate change influencing habitat
condition57,58. The timescale of a fisheries collapse has been
shown to lie within decades59. Roughly consistent with observa-
tional and modeled data from the Baltic sea, where the stable
regime of high cod biomass lasted approximately from 1970 to
199057,60, we assume a typical collapse timescale of around 20
years. Concerning the typical recovery time scale, successful
attempts of fish stocks recovery lasted for decades61, but is
estimated to generally exceed this duration62. We therefore
assume a larger typical recovery timescale of around 50 years. The
color gradient in Fig. 5 at the fisheries point does not clearly
single out a paradigms regime, indicating the dependence on the
other parameters at this point. A risky policy might be
economically optimal (Fig. 5, red), but leads eventually to the
collapse of fish stock (c.f59.). At the collapsed and degraded state
the conditions for the fishers are not acceptable. Therefore they
have to leave the system and cannot wait for the fish’s recovery.
But further investigation is needed to reduce the uncertainty with
respect to the other parameters.
Last, we look at the case of land degradation by farming in our
stylized model. Land degradation and restoration is a complex
topic with many influencing factors63. Nevertheless, land
degradation by farming has been identified as a tipping element
by Kinzig and others64, where the authors discuss the case of the
western Australian wheatbelt with a typical collapse timescale of
about 100 years. Soil recovery is estimated to take place within 20
to 1000 years65, which is roughly consistent to Kitzing et al.,
where the duration to reach equilibrium again is estimated with
up to 300 years. We therefore assume a typical recovery timescale
of about 300 years. In contrast to climate and fisheries, the
transition probabilities we associated with the process of land
degradation by farming suggest, that here an optimality paradigm
is very likely to yield the risky policy which is neither sustainable
nor safe despite considerate parameter uncertainty (red area in
Fig. 5).
Taken together, it is interesting to see that in particular the
climate system may reside at the edge of the parameter regime
where economic welfare optimization becomes neither sustain-
able nor safe (Fig. 3). For land degradation by farming, our
assessment suggests that an optimal policy is likely to yield a non-
sustainable and non-safe policy whereas for fisheries the situation
is less clear.
Discussion
Overall, our results show that there exists no master paradigm
among the three examined in our model of environmental gov-
ernance of a stylized tipping element. Policies can be classified by
any combination of optimal, sustainable and safe. A master
paradigm, in contrast, would guarantee fulfilling requirements
imposed by other paradigms. Consequently, the selection of
appropriate policy paradigms, especially in more complex settings
and models, can be critical for effective environmental
governance.
Specifically, our results show theoretically, as well as empiri-
cally that economic welfare optimization for managing tipping
opt, not sus, not safe
not opt, not sus, not safe
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Normalized parameter space volume of paradigms combinations
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Fig. 4 Ratios of parameter space volumes for all eight paradigms
combination. All parameters (δ, ρ, γ, rl/rh, rmin/rh) were chosen linearly
between 0 and 1 for both the risky and the cautious policy. As a direct
consequence of our definitions of the safe operating space paradigm and
the cautious and risky policy, all paradigm combinations which are safe
correspond to the use of the cautious policy, in all others the risky policy
was applied. A random decision making agent within a random tipping
element will most likely end up with a policy that is neither optimal, neither
sustainable nor safe, followed by the parameter sweet spot regime where
the policy is simultaneously optimal, sustainable and safe. Interestingly, the
third likeliest option is a parameter regime which is optimal, but neither
sustainable nor safe
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elements may be neither sustainable nor safe. For example, the
volume of the corresponding paradigm combination in parameter
space is the largest among those in which the three paradigms
actually yield different policies. This suggests the conclusion that
the mere structure of a tipping element causes a comparable high
chance of obtaining a policy that is neither sustainable nor safe
when blindly following an optimization paradigm. On the other
hand, our model also indicates parameter regimes where eco-
nomic optimization can safely and sustainably be used.
We derived simple heuristics to anticipate when a policy is
economic welfare optimal, sustainable and safe. A risky policy
may be optimal when the probability of collapse and/or the far-
sightedness are sufficiently small. It may be sustainable when the
probability of a collapse is sufficiently small but the farsightedness
is sufficiently large. However, it cannot be safe. A cautious policy
may be optimal when the collapse probability and/or the far-
sightedness are sufficiently large. It is sustainable if its immediate
reward exceeds the normatively chosen minimum acceptable
reward and it is always safe. The absence of a master paradigm is
of special relevance for governing the climate system, since the
latter may reside at the edge between parameter regimes where
economic welfare optimization becomes neither sustainable nor
safe.
Extensions are possible in many directions. Constrained opti-
mization24 is a straight-forward way to combine the paradigms
examined. Policy makers could aim for the maximum economic
welfare delivering a policy that is safe and sustainable, or least-
cost safe target strategies15. This is certainly a better approach
than relying on economic welfare optimization alone for model-
based policy advice. Examples of models for policy advice cer-
tainly include integrated assessment models or the use of the
maximum sustainable yield in fisheries management. However,
one might not desire to obtain the welfare optimal safe and
sustainable policy but e.g., the most resilient one, which calls for
an operationalization of modern social-ecological resilience
concepts66.
The application of our model to real-world systems in this
article is of qualitative, illustrative nature. A more detailed
analysis of real world tipping elements in which typical transition
probabilities might be estimated from empirical time series could
be a way forward to systematize and draw lessons from the
multitude of human-environmental tipping elements67.
Applying our analyses to larger, more complex Markov deci-
sion processes would be a way to extend the understanding of the
relationships between the paradigms examined. Moreover, it may
be desirable to include further policy paradigms into the analyses,
e.g., aiming for a large option space of future decision
makers30,68. Based on such analyses, policy makers could make
better informed decisions on how to translate the Sustainable
Development Goals and the Paris climate agreement into con-
crete policy implementations.
Methods
Derivation of value functions. There are four deterministic policies in our
Markov decision process model: (1) πr(p)= h, πr(d)= l, (2) πc(p)= l, πc(d)= l, (3)
π3(p)= h, π3(d)= h, (4) π4(p)= l, π4(d)= h. We concentrate on deterministic
policies only to simplify the calculation without loss of generality, because if an
optimal policy exits there exits also a deterministic optimal policy46. We further
focus here only on the first two policies, named the risky and the cautious policy,
since the remaining two apply a high pressure action at the degraded state. This
will trap the agent at this position for eternity without receiving any reward. The
math on these policies is left to the interested reader.
In the following we derive the analytical expressions of the state values of these
policies as functions of the parameters (δ, ρ, γ, rl, rh). From Eq. 1 and for γ < 1 one
can derive the recursive relationship between state values, known as the Bellman
Equation69:
vπ sð Þ ¼
X
s′
p s′js; π sð Þð Þ 1 γð Þr s; π sð Þ; s′ð Þ þ γvπ s′ð Þ½  ð3Þ
with p(s′|s, π(s)) being the probability to enter state s′ given the agent has started in
state s and applied action π(s).
Applied to our model the value for the prosperous state reads
vπ pð Þ ¼
δγvπ dð Þ þ 1 δð Þ 1 γð Þrh þ γvπ pð Þ½  for a ¼ h
1 γð Þrl þ γvπ pð Þ for a ¼ l

: ð4Þ
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Fig. 5 Human-environment systems in paradigms classification. For risky (a) and (b) cautious policy here shown in model parameter space of collapse
probability δ versus recovery probability ρ. Color indicates the paradigms combination similarly as in Fig. 3. Here, additional gradual changes between the
color regimes indicate the probability of being in a certain paradigms combinations regime under parameter uncertainty ranges. Remaining parameters
where chosen linearly within the range of 0.95≤ γ≤ 0.99, 0.3≤ rl/rh≤ 0.7, 0.1≤ rmin/rh≤ 0.5. The approx. transition probabilities δ and ρ were assigned to
the human-environment systems climate, fisheries and farming agriculture according to the timescale of the average time spent in one state (see
Methods). For farming, a risky policy is likely to be optimal but neither sustainable nor safe. The parameter uncertainty of the other parameters does not
allow a clear statement in which parameter regime fisheries are likely to fall. The climate system may lie at the edge of the sweet spot, where all paradigms
yield the cautious policy. However, for smaller collapse probability δ optimization is more likely to yield the risky policy, which becomes also neither
sustainable nor safe at this point. This suggests the use of other paradigms for climate policy making
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The value for the degraded state is given by
vπ dð Þ ¼
γvπ dð Þ for a ¼ h
1 ρð Þγvπ dð Þ þ ργvπ pð Þ for a ¼ l

: ð5Þ
To obtain the explicit state values for the risky policy (πr(p)= h, πr(d)= l) we
solve the system of equations
vπr pð Þ ¼ δγvπr dð Þ þ 1 δð Þ 1 γð Þrh þ γvπr pð Þ
h i
ð6Þ
vπr dð Þ ¼ 1 ρð Þγvπr dð Þ þ ργvπr pð Þ; ð7Þ
which yields
vπr pð Þ ¼ rh
1 δð Þ 1 1 ρð Þγð Þ
1 1 δ  ρð Þγ ð8Þ
vπr dð Þ ¼ rh
1 δð Þργ
1 1 δ  ρð Þγ : ð9Þ
To obtain the explicit state values for the cautious policy (πc(p)= l, πc(d)= l) we
solve the system of equations
vπc pð Þ ¼ 1 γð Þrl þ γvπc pð Þ ð10Þ
vπc dð Þ ¼ 1 ρð Þγvπc dð Þ þ ργvπc pð Þ; ð11Þ
which yields
vπc pð Þ ¼ rl ð12Þ
vπc dð Þ ¼
ργrl
1 1 ρð Þγ : ð13Þ
For γ= 1 we compute the values vπ (which are independent from the initial
state for γ= 1) by multiplying the stationary state of the effective Markov chain
with the reward vector rπ 2 RjSj whose components read
rπs ¼
X
s′
p s′js; π sð Þð Þr s; π sð Þ; s′ð Þ: ð14Þ
The components of the transition matrix Pπ of the effective Markov chain read
Pπs′s ¼ p s′jπ sð Þ; sð Þ: ð15Þ
The stationary state σπ is the normalized eigenvector of the transition matrix
with eigenvalue one. Hence,
vπ ¼ σπ  rπ : ð16Þ
Performing this calculation for risky and cautious policy explicitly yields
consistent results with the calculation for 0 ≤ γ < 1 from above. For γ= 1 the value
vπ can be obtained by simply inserting γ= 1 into Eqs. 8 and 9 for the risky policy
and Eqs. 12 and 13 for the cautious policy.
Analytical expressions for paradigm policy classification. To derive the
analytical expression of the hypersurface in parameter space that separates the
regions where either the risky or the cautious policy is optimal we set
vπr pð Þ¼
set
vπc pð Þ (or equivalently vπr dð Þ¼
set
vπc dð Þ, since the parameter
combination where a policy is optimal is independent from the state) and implicitly
obtain
~rh  1 ~δ
 
1 ~γ 1 ~ρð Þð Þ ¼ ~rl  1 ~γ 1 ~δ  ~ρ
  
: ð17Þ
To obtain the hypersurface that separates state s being acceptable from being
not acceptable under policy π we apply the definition from Eq. 2: vπ sð Þ¼set rmin.
Hence, for the risky policy at the prosperous state we set vπr pð Þ¼
set
rmin and obtain
implicitly
~rh  1 ~δ
 
1 ~γ 1 ~ρð Þð Þ ¼ ~rmin  1 ~γ 1 ~δ  ~ρ
  
: ð18Þ
For the risky policy at the degraded state we set vπr dð Þ¼
set
rmin and obtain
implicitly
~rh  1 ~δ
 
~ρ~γ ¼ ~rmin  1 ~γ 1 ~δ  ~ρ
  
: ð19Þ
For the cautious policy at the prosperous state we set vπc pð Þ¼
set
rmin and obtain
implicitly
~rl ¼ ~rmin: ð20Þ
For the cautious policy at the degraded state we set vπc dð Þ¼
set
rmin and obtain
implicitly
~rl  ~ρ~γ ¼ ~rmin  1 ~γ 1 ~ρð Þð Þ ð21Þ
To get from acceptability to sustainability for the risky policy one has to
logically combine Eqs. 18 and 19. The risky policy is sustainable only if both the
prosperous and the degraded state are acceptable since it will visit both states
recurrently. The safe policy is sustainable exactly where the prosperous state is
acceptable since it will eventually end up and remain at the prosperous state.
Supplementary Fig. 1 shows an example of the acceptability division of state-
parameter space and the resulting sustainability division.
The division of the parameter space according the safe operating space
paradigm is obvious from its definition. Only the cautious policy is a safe policy
since it will eventually end up and remain in the prosperous, safe operating space
state. The risky policy switches recurrently between the prosperous and the
degraded which makes it, by definition, not safe.
Conversion of timescales to transition probabilities. Let p be the probability per
time step that a system state will transition into another state. The average number
of time steps the system will be in that state is given by 〈N〉= (1− p)/p. Inverting
yields p= 1/(〈N〉+ 1). We map a model time step to a year. Thus, a collapse time
scale of e.g., 50 years corresponds to a collapse probability of δ ≈ 0.02. Supple-
mentary Tab. 1 shows the assumed transition timescales and corresponding
transition probabilities.
Code availability. Python code for the reproduction of the reported results plus
interactive versions of the figures can be downloaded from https://github.com/
wbarfuss/Paradigms.
Data availability. Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were
stored on disk during the production of the figures (see Code availability).
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